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Abstract 
 
Asia is currently the scene of some of the most high-profile maritime disputes in the world. Even though 
the majority of States in Asia are parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”), its dispute settlement system has only been utilized in a handful of cases. Given that 
negotiations have brought about limited result in easing many of the tensions, it is worth asking whether the 
UNCLOS dispute settlement system can play a role in the resolution of maritime disputes in Asia. This 
paper, based on a review of the case law of UNCLOS tribunals, as well the advantages and limitations of 
the system, argues that the UNCLOS dispute settlement system can make meaningful contributions to 
resolving thorny disputes between Asian States. It does so by providing a solution to the dispute brought 
before them, clarifying the legal framework for the conduct of the parties and facilitating cooperation 
amongst countries in the region.   
 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or “the Convention”),2 
often referred to as the “Constitution for the Oceans”, 3  establishes a system for dispute 
settlement which constitutes an integral part of the Convention. In particular, Part XV of 
UNCLOS on Settlement of Disputes sets out compulsory dispute settlement procedures which 
are binding on a State once it becomes a party to the Convention.  Even though there are several 
exclusions and limitations to the compulsory jurisdiction of the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
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2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396. 
3 “A Constitution for the Oceans”, Remarks by Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, President of the Third 
United Nations Conference of the Law, Statements by the President on 6 and 11 December 1982, online: 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf>. 
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bodies, Part XV is considered to have established one of most comprehensive and innovative 
dispute settlement systems to date.4  
The majority of States in Asia are parties to UNCLOS. This means that they are entitled to 
invoke the dispute settlement procedures to settle a dispute concerning UNCLOS. Yet thus far, 
the UNCLOS dispute settlement system has only been utilized in a handful of instances by Asian 
States to resolve their maritime disputes. This reality may reflect the general reluctance, perhaps 
even skepticism, on the part of many Asian States towards third-party mechanisms in the 
resolution of their disputes, especially those considered highly politically sensitive in nature. 5 
However, based on a review of the disputes between Asian States handled by UNCLOS dispute 
settlement bodies, this paper argues that the UNCLOS dispute settlement system has great 
potential and may play a meaningful role in the resolution of long-standing territorial and 
maritime disputes in Asia.  
To that end, the paper will first look at the decisions taken by the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) and Annex VII arbitral tribunals in four maritime disputes 
between Asian countries brought before them, all of which touch upon legal issues that are at the 
heart of many of the existing maritime disputes in Asia. Based on the results of these cases, the 
paper will proceed to analyze the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals to the resolution of the 
disputes in question and to the maintenance of peace in the region. The paper then examines the 
advantages and limitations of the UNCLOS dispute settlement in resolving maritime disputes in 
Asia, before reaching the conclusion regarding the role that the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
system may play in the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in the region.   
I. MARITIME DISPUTES BETWEEN ASIAN STATES BEFORE UNCLOS DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT BODIES 
To date, UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies have received four cases in which both the 
applicants and the respondents are States from Asia. These cases will be the focus of this 
Section. It should be noted that even though the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is listed 
under Article 287 as one of the fora to which UNCLOS State parties can bring their disputes; 
thus far, none of the cases brought before the ICJ have been initiated under the auspices of 																																																								
4 John E. NOYES, “Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea” (1989) 4 CJIL 675; O.A. ADEDE, “Settlement of Disputes Arising Under the Law of the Sea Convention” 
(1975) 69 AJIL 798. 
5 Tara DAVENPORT, “Joint Development in Asia: Lessons for sustainable peace in the South China Sea” 8th 
Asian Law Institute Conference, Japan 2011; Park Hee WON, The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia: A Challenge 
for Cooperation (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 117. 
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UNCLOS. Therefore, even though there have been maritime cases brought before the ICJ 
involving two Asian States,6 they are beyond the purview of this article.  
A. Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) 
On 4 July 2003, Malaysia instituted arbitral proceedings under Annex VII UNCLOS arbitral 
tribunal in a dispute concerning land reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor. 
Malaysia opposed these activities on grounds of transboundary environmental impact and 
potential implications on its side of the waters. Pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, 
Malaysia requested ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures pursuant to Article 290(5) 
UNCLOS. Malaysia asked ITLOS to order Singapore to suspend its land reclamation activities 
and to cooperate with Malaysia, including providing Malaysia with full information when 
conducting the activities,.7 
Under Article 290(5), provisional measures may only be prescribed “if the urgency of the 
situation so requires” to preserve the rights of the parties or to protect the marine environment. In 
the sector of Tuas, the ITLOS held that the evidence showed no urgency and the rights that 
Malaysia claimed in the territorial sea faced no risk of being irreversibly damaged. The Tribunal, 
therefore, declined to prescribe any provisional measure in this sector.8 In the area of Pulau 
Tekong, the Tribunal held that Singapore had not undertaken any assessment on the impact of 
the land reclamation on the waters under the jurisdiction of Malaysia. Consequently, it could not 
exclude the adverse effects that land reclamation works may have on the marine environment.9 
ITLOS, however, did not order the suspension of the land reclamation works as requested by 
Malaysia. Instead, it ordered the establishment of a group of independent experts with the 
mandate to conduct a study on the effects of Singapore’s land reclamation and to propose 
measures to deal with any adverse effects of such land reclamation.10  
Subsequently, the parties notified both ITLOS and the Annex VII arbitral tribunal that the 
Group of Experts established pursuant to the ITLOS Order had completed its report,11 on the 																																																								
6 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), [2002] I.C.J. Rep. 625; Sovereignty over 
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), [2008] I.C.J. Rep. 12. 
7 Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 
October 2003, [2003] ITLOS Rep. 10.  
8 Ibid., at 72. 
9 Ibid., at 96. 
10 Ibid., at 96. 
11 Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), 
Decision of 1 September 2005, [2007] XXVII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 133 at 19.  
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basis of which, they signed a Settlement Agreement in May 2005.12 The parties then requested 
the arbitral tribunal to deliver an Award binding upon the Parties in accordance with the terms 
set out in the Settlement Agreement.13 What this essentially meant was that even though a third 
party was asked to render a binding decision, the content of that decision had already been 
determined by the two parties themselves. The arbitral proceedings that would have otherwise 
taken place were therefore terminated.  
This was not the first land reclamation activity carried out by Singapore, and certainly not the 
first one to have met objection from Malaysia. 14  Given the lack of environmental impact 
assessment, and as the Tribunal admitted, the possibility of adverse impact on the marine 
environment in the Strait of Johor, one could reasonably have expected ITLOS to order the 
suspension of land reclamation activities as requested by Malaysia. However, given its 
geographical condition, Singapore conducts land reclamation activities on a frequent basis in 
order to provide additional space to accommodate its housing, industrial and economic needs.15 
In a relatively small area with a sensitive ecological system such as that of the Strait of Johor,16 
the impacts of land reclamation activities may not be limited to the waters under the jurisdiction 
of Singapore. The prevalence of land reclamation activities in region means that the suspension 
of one project may not be of much use, both to addressing the conflict between the parties and to 
the preservation of the marine environment. It was thus important that ITLOS placed utmost 
emphasis on the need for cooperation between the parties. By stressing the duty to cooperate and 
by prescribing concrete measures to ensure that the duty to cooperate would be observed, ITLOS 
was able to not only settle the dispute before it, but also provide authoritative guidance for future 
cases in which the same issues might arise.  
Furthermore, the establishment of a Group of Expert allowed the parties to fulfill their 
international obligation, i.e the duty to cooperate, and at the same time, retain a final say as to the 
measures to be adopted. Some States fear that by going to international courts and tribunals, the 
final solution will be one that is imposed by a third party which could be at odds with their own 
national interests. The ITLOS Order and the subsequent events prove that this is not always the 																																																								
12 Ibid., at 21. 
13 Ibid., at 24. 
14 KOG Yue-Choong, Environmental Management and Conflict in Southeast Asia – Land Reclamation and its 
Political Impact, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore Working Paper Series, online: 
<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP101.pdf>. 
15  Tommy KOH, Jolene LIN, “The Land Reclamation Case: Thoughts and Reflections” (2006) 10 Singapore 
Yearbook of International Law 1 at 1. 
16 KOG Yue-Choong, supra note 14. 
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case. The Order, as mentioned, allowed the parties to reach an agreement in their own terms 
regarding a variety of issues which are not only limited to land reclamation.17 In other words, it 
paved the way for more comprehensive cooperation, even beyond the scope of its provisional 
measures. 
One may wonder what the use of third-party settlement in this case was, given that the parties 
had already managed to reach an agreement for a final solution of their own accord. The answer 
lies in the fact that third party mechanism is useful to help break the initial impasse and to 
provide an alternative option for the parties to resolve their disputes. In fact, it is not uncommon 
for neighbouring States to conflict with each other in more than one issue. For countries with a 
history of rivalry, such as Malaysia and Singapore, the parties tend to politicize the dispute to the 
extent that it would be difficult to step back or compromise without third party intervention.18 In 
fact, Tommy Koh observed that the outcome of the Land Reclamation case helped increase 
Singapore’s confidence in third-party dispute settlement.19 The ITLOS Order, therefore, set a 
favourable precedence for the use of international judicial mechanism for the countries in the 
region. 
Apart from resolving the dispute between the parties, ITLOS has also been praised in the 
Land Reclamation case for ensuring that the environment was protected by reference to 
independent, expert advice. One scholar commented that compared with prior cases in which the 
issue of marine environment protection also arose, such as the Southern Bluefin Tuna and MOX 
Plant cases,20 ITLOS in this case showed greater willingness to become involved in the detailed 
modalities of environmental dispute resolution through a high degree of supervision of 
settlement process.21  
B. Bangladesh/Myanmar 
The maritime boundary dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar had for a long time been a 
bone of contention in the two States’ bilateral relationship. Efforts to settle the disputes had taken 
																																																								
17 See Annex of Land Reclamation Award, supra note 11. 
18 Tommy KOH, Jolene LIN, supra note 15 at 6. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 
1999, [1999] ITLOS Rep. 280; MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 
December 2001, [2001] ITLOS Rep. 95. 
21 Tim STEPHENS, International Courts and Environment Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 242. 
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place for decades with limited progress.22 In 2009, Bangladesh decided to utilize the UNCLOS 
dispute settlement mechanism and the dispute between the two was brought to ITLOS,23 even 
though initially Bangladesh instituted proceedings before Annex VII arbitral tribunal. In their 
submissions, the parties requested ITLOS to draw boundary lines to delimit their territorial sea, 
exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) and continental shelf.  
As per the parties’ request, first ITLOS applied the equidistance principle as stipulated under 
Article 15 UNCLOS to delimit the territorial sea. In the course of doing so, the Tribunal gave St. 
Martin’s Island, which belongs to Bangladesh, a 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea.24 For the 
EEZ and continental shelf, ITLOS decided to draw a single boundary for both maritime zones by 
following the three-stage delimitation process which was laid out by the ICJ in the Black Sea 
case.25 As the first step, ITLOS rejected Bangladesh’s argument that the angle-bisector line 
should be employed instead of the equidistance line.26 The Tribunal also rejected Bangladesh’s 
submissions that St. Martin’s Island and the Bengal depositional system should be taken into 
account as relevant circumstances.27 It only accepted Bangladesh’s argument concerning the 
concavity of its coastline.28 Accordingly, the Tribunal adjusted the provisional line, with a view 
to avoid the equidistance line cutting off the southward projection of the coast of Bangladesh as a 
result of its concavity. Finally, applying the proportionality test, the Tribunal was satisfied that 
the end result was proportionate, which meant that the use of the adjusted equidistance line 
produced an equitable result for both States.29  
Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of ITLOS’ judgment in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case 
was the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200nm, usually referred to as the outer 
continental shelf. Article 76(8) UNCLOS requires States, when claiming a continental shelf 
beyond 200nm, to make a submission to specify the limits of its continental shelf to a technical 																																																								
22  See Jared BISSINGER, “The Maritime Boundary Dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar: Motivations, 
Potential Solutions, and Implications” (2010) 19 Asia Policy 103. 
23 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay Of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, [2002] ITLOS 
Rep. 4 at 3, 4. 
24 Ibid., at 152–53. 
25 Ibid., at 233. This three-stage process involves: (i) drawing a provisional equidistance line, (ii) determining 
whether there are any relevant circumstances that call for the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line and (iii) 
using the proportionality test to ensure that the final outcome is equitable. 
26 Ibid., at 234–39. 
27 Ibid., at 318, 320. 
28 Ibid., at 324. 
29 Ibid., at 477. 
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body called the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS” or “the 
Commission”). Once the CLCS has made a recommendation with regards to a State’s 
submission, the outer limits of the continental shelf established based on this recommendation 
will be final and binding. In this case, both Bangladesh and Myanmar had made their 
submissions to the CLCS prior to the initiation of the case; however, Bangladesh objected to the 
CLCS considering Myanmar’s submission. As the CLCS is barred from examining any 
submission relating to a disputed area unless all parties to such a dispute give their consent,30 the 
Commission did not issue any recommendation for either party.31 Despite the absence of the 
CLCS’ recommendation as to where the limits of the continental shelves would be beyond 
200nm, ITLOS was satisfied that the thickness of the sediment in the Bay of Bengal enabled 
both parties to claim an outer continental shelf in accordance with Article 76 (4)(a)(i), and that 
the parties’ continental shelves overlapped .32 On that basis, it found that it had jurisdiction and 
exercised that jurisdiction to delimit the extended continental shelf.33 The Tribunal then extended 
the boundary line  used within the 200nm maritime area to that beyond 200nm.34  
The delimitation of the outer continental shelf created for the first time in international 
jurisprudence a so-called “grey area” which is an area located beyond 200nm from the coast of 
Bangladesh but within 200nm from the coast of Myanmar, yet on Bangladesh side of the 
delimitation line.35 In this area, the sovereign rights with respect to the seabed and subsoil belong 
to Bangladesh, while those with respect to the superjacent water rest with Myanmar.  
The dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar was the first maritime boundary case dealt 
with by ITLOS. The outcome of the case, therefore, carried great significance not only for the 
parties concerned but also for the reputation of the Tribunal as a specialized court for law of the 
sea.  
First, the judgment put to rest a decade-old dispute between two neighbouring countries, 
which helped to deflect any potential military clashes and ensure political stability for the two 																																																								
30 Rules of the Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Annex I, paragraph 5(a). 
31 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 23 at 389-90. 
32 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 23 at 444–46. 
33  This was not the first time an international tribunal established that it had jurisdiction to delimit the outer 
continental shelf. But it was the first time the tribunal exercised its jurisdiction to do so. See Arbitration between 
Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and 
the continental shelf between them, Decision of 11 April 2006, [2006] XXVII Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards 147 at 209. 
34 Ibid., at 462. 
35 Ibid., at 463. 
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countries, as well as for the Bay of Bengal area. The boundary dispute between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar, despite having existed since the former’s independence, was only seriously rekindled 
following the commencement of natural gas exploration by Myanmar in waters claimed by 
Bangladesh.36 The prospects of exploitable resources and increasing internal demands prompted 
each State to deploy naval forces to prevent efforts from the other to conduct survey or 
exploration in the waters that each claimed to be under its jurisdiction. At one point, this tension 
escalated to a serious standoff in the Bay of Bengal, heightening the risk of war between two 
otherwise friendly Asian nations.37 Against this bleak background and in light of the fact that 
neither country preferred joint development, the judgment provided a peaceful and workable 
solution to the conflict between the two States.38  
Second, the judgment opened up important prospects for the two countries to boost their 
economic development through exploitation of the resources in their delimited maritime 
zones⎯including fisheries, mineral resources, natural gas⎯without fear of interruption or 
objection. In other words, the ITLOS judgment helped put an end to a dispute that had impeded 
economic development for the two countries which are among the least developed members of 
the international community.39  
The fact that ITLOS proceeded to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200nm is also 
noteworthy.40 The situation that often arises with regards to delimitation of outer continental 
shelf is that a court cannot delimit overlapping extended continental shelves unless the States in 
question have established that they have entitlements to the continental shelf beyond 200nm. 
This, in turn, can only be done upon the recommendation of the CLCS. However, as was in this 
case, the CLCS cannot render recommendations for submissions which are disputed by other 
parties. This ultimately results in an impasse before both the CLCS and the court, which in effect 
freezes any efforts the resolution process. The decision of ITLOS to delimit the outer continental 																																																								
36 Sarah WATSON, “The Bangladesh/Myanmar Maritime Dispute: Lessons for Peaceful Resolution” Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative (19 October 2015), online: <http://amti.csis.org/the-bangladeshmyanmar-maritime-dispute-
lessons-for-peaceful-resolution/>. 
37  Animesh ROUL, “Standoff in the Bay of Bengal” The International Relations and Security Network (20 
November 2008), online: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lang=en&id=93998>.   
38 Jared BISSINGER, supra note 22 at 137. 
39 Pranab Kumar PANDAY, “Bangladesh and Myanmar Resolve Longstanding Maritime Dispute” East Asia Forum 
(26 April 2012), online:   
<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/04/26/bangladesh-and-myanmar-resolve-longstanding-maritime-dispute/>. 
40  Robin CHURCHILL, “The Bangladesh/Myanmar Case: Continuity and Novelty in the Law of Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation” (2012) 1(1) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 137. 
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notwithstanding the absence of a recommendation from the CLCS helped to resolve what 
Bangladesh called “a jurisdictional black hole”41 and allowed the settlement of a long-standing 
dispute to move forward.  
Some scholars have expressed concerns that in calling for cooperation in the “grey area”, 
ITLOS might have been overly-optimistic. 42 After all, the parties were unable to resolve their 
differences after many years of diplomatic effort. Notwithstanding the final and binding ITLOS 
judgment, they may have to return to the negotiating table to agree on the allocation of 
jurisdiction in the “grey area”. Indeed, the creation of a zone of multiple jurisdiction may pose 
functional difficulties for the parties in exercising their sovereign rights and jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, to date, few reports have emerged regarding on the parties’ conflicts in this “grey 
area”. In practice, cooperation is not impossible as several States have managed to agree on a 
cooperation scheme in areas of the same nature.43 
C. Bangladesh/India 
The maritime boundary dispute between Bangladesh and India concerned the remaining part of 
the Bay of Bengal, the north-western part. The two States had been engaged in inconclusive 
negotiations on the delimitation of their maritime boundary since the 1970s and the disputes 
became acute as a consequence of the prospects of and the States’ internal demands for gas in the 
overlapping area.44 Bangladesh initiated proceedings before Annex VII arbitral tribunals against 
both Myanmar and India in 2009. As mentioned, Myanmar subsequently proposed to transfer the 
case to ITLOS, to which Bangladesh agreed, while the case between Bangladesh and India 
continued through arbitration. The Arbitral Award was rendered in July 2014.45 
The submissions that Bangladesh brought before the arbitral tribunal were very much similar 
to those in the case with Myanmar before ITLOS. Bangladesh requested the tribunal to delimit 																																																								
41 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 23 at 358. 
42 Clive SCHOFIELD, Anastasia TELESETSKY, ‘Grey Clouds or Clearer Skies Ahead? Implications of The Bay of 
Bengal Case’ (2012) 3 Law  of  the  Sea  Reports at 10.  
43 See David A. COLSON, “The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighboring States” (2003) 
97 American Journal of International Law 91 at 94; Raghavendra MISHRA, “The ‘Grey Area’ in the Northern Bay 
of Bengal: A Note on a Functional Cooperative Solution” (2016) 47(1) Ocean Development & International Law 29. 
44 Naomi BURKE, “Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal Delimits Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and India in the 
Bay of Bengal’ (2014) 18 ASIL Insights, online: <http://asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/20/annex-vii-arbitral-
tribunal-delimits-maritime-boundary-between#_edn3>. 
45  Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh/India), Arbitral Award at 411, online: 
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage5a3b.html?pag_id=1376>. 
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the overlapping territorial seas, EEZs and continental shelves with India. It should be noted also 
that three out of the five arbitrators in the Bangladesh/India case were judges of ITLOS who also 
dealt with the Bangladesh/Myanmar case. Coupled with the fact that the areas delimited shared 
many geographical similarities, it is perhaps not difficult to understand why the Arbitral Award 
as well as the parties’ arguments was extensively based on the ITLOS judgment. In delimiting 
the territorial sea, the arbitral tribunal applied the equidistance/median line in accordance with 
Article 15 after rejecting Bangladesh’s argument that “special circumstances” called for the use 
of another method.46 The arbitral tribunal only adjusted the equidistance line so that the eventual 
boundary starts from land boundary terminus and run southwards until it meets the median line.47  
For the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf, the arbitral tribunal continued to follow 
the three-stage delimitation process. First, the tribunal, having rejected Bangladesh’s argument in 
favour of the use of angle-bisector, drew a provisional equidistance line.48 Then the tribunal 
adjusted the provisional equidistance line to take into account of the cut-off effect produced by 
the concavity of Bangladesh’s coast. In line with concept of the single continental shelf, 
theadjustment of the provisional line for the EEZ and continental shelf was considered in 
connection with the continental shelf beyond 200nm.49  
The approach of the arbitral tribunal to delimiting the outer continental shelf followed that of 
ITLOS in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case. The arbitral tribunal held that the provisional 
equidistance line should still be applied but adjusted to take into account the cut-off effect 
produced by the concavity of Bangladesh’s coast. 50  As with the ITLOS judgment, such a 
boundary created a “grey area” which lay beyond 200nm from the coast of Bangladesh and 
within 200nm from the coast of India, but on Bangladesh’s side of the boundary. Endorsing what 
ITLOS had previously held with regards to the “grey area”, the arbitral tribunal concluded that 
the establishment of “an area in which the States concerned have shared right is not unknown 
under the Convention”, and called on the parties to determine the measures appropriate in a 
cooperative spirit to exercise their rights and fulfill their duties under UNCLOS.51  
The Arbitral Award in the Bangladesh/India case, together with the Bangladesh/Myanmar 
judgment of ITLOS, completed the delimitation of the Bay of Bengal. The resolution of maritime 
																																																								
46 Ibid., at 248.  
47 Ibid., at 274–76. 
48 Ibid., at 346. 
49 Ibid., at 437. 
50 Ibid., at 408. 
51 Ibid., at 507–08.  
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delimitation disputes ended decades of uncertainty as to allocation of maritime entitlements, 52 
which created political and economic security and stability for all States concerned. Similar to 
the Bangladesh/Myanmar judgment, the Award provides clarity and legal certainty as to the 
exact location of the maritime boundary between the two nations. In light of the discoveries of 
huge natural gas deposits beneath the sea, proving the Bay of Bengal to be a highly lucrative site 
of energy reserves,53 the decision was important to attract investors to engage in exploration and 
exploitation of oil and gas. The judgment was broadly accepted by both the countries as a 
positive development for further consolidation of friendly relations especially given the geo-
strategic and political significance of greater Indian Ocean region and South Asian subregion. 
The foreign minister of Bangladesh called it ‘a victory for friendship between Bangladesh and 
India’, while a statement from India’s external affairs ministry says that the boundary settlement 
will ‘enhance mutual understanding and goodwill between India and Bangladesh by bringing to 
closure a long-pending issue’.54 
D. Philippines v. China 
The South China Sea has witnessed serious escalation which has resulted in the use of military 
forces, arms race and nationalist public demonstrations in several countries.55 Meanwhile, the 
lack of tangible progress in resolving these conflicts has caused serious concerns not only for the 
countries in the region but also for the international community. In such a context, the decision 
of the Philippines to initiate proceedings against China before Annex VII arbitral tribunal in 
January 2013 unsurprisingly attracted considerable attention. 
By way of background, the disputes in the South China Sea between China, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and to a certain extent, Brunei can be categorized into two main types: (i) 
disputes concerning the islands and (ii) disputes concerning maritime delimitation. The first type 																																																								
52 Naomi BURKE, supra note 44. 
53 Rajeev SHARMA, “UN tribunal puts an end to 40-year-old India-Bangladesh maritime dispute” RT Question 
More (16 July 2014), online: <https://www.rt.com/op-edge/172960-un-india-bangladesh-dispute-end/>  
54 Rupak BHATTACHARJEE, “Delimitation of Indo-Bangladesh Maritime Boundary” Institute for Defence Studies 
and Analyses (19 August 2014), online: <http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DelimitationofIndo-
Bangladesh_rbhattacharjee_190814>. 
55 Ankit PANDA, “Reclamation, Arbitration, Competition: South China Sea Situation Report” The Diplomat (09 
May 2015), online: < http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/reclamation-arbitration-competition-south-china-sea-situation-
report/>; Julian BORGER, Tom PHILLIPS, “How China's artificial islands led to tension in the South China Sea” 
The Guardian (27 October 2015), online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/27/tensions-and-territorial-
claims-in-the-south-china-sea-the-guardian-briefing>. 
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of disputes relating to islands can be further divided into two smaller subcategories, which are (i) 
disputes relating to sovereignty over the islands and (ii) disputes relating to the legal status of the 
features within the groups of islands under Article 121 UNCLOS.56 The most controversial claim 
in the South China Sea perhaps belongs to China with its nine-dash line encompassing almost the 
whole of the South China Sea.57 China has not to date provided any official explanation not 
clarification of legal basis for this line. 
The Philippines’ case, however, did not involve all of these issues. The Philippines requested 
the arbitral tribunal to consider 15 submissions, which could be broadly grouped into three inter-
related matters. First, China’s claims based on “historic rights” encompassed within its so-called 
“nine-dash line” were inconsistent with the Convention and therefore invalid. Second, under the 
Convention, certain maritime features claimed by both China and the Philippines should be 
properly characterized as rocks or low tide elevations, not islands. Third, China violated the 
Convention by interfering with the exercise of the Philippines’ sovereign rights and freedoms 
under the Convention and through construction and fishing activities that harmed the marine 
environment.58  
China, for its part, officially announced that it would not participate in the arbitral 
proceedings. Nevertheless, China hardly adopted a hands-off policy towards the arbitral 
proceedings.59 Officially, the Chinese government issued a Position Paper in which China argued 
that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear the case for three main reasons: (i) the 
subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over maritime features in the South 
China Sea, (ii) China and the Philippines had agreed to settle their disputes through negotiations 
through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South 
China Sea (DOC) and (iii) even if the subject-matter of the dispute concerned the UNCLOS, it 
																																																								
56 See Robert BECKMAN, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South 
China Sea” (2013) 107(1) The American Journal of International Law 142. 
57 Note of China No. CML/17/2009 dated 7 May 2009, online: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf > 
58 The Republic of the Philippines v The People’s Republic of China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility at 4– 
6, online: <http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506>  
59  Lan NGUYEN, “South China Sea: Philippines v. China” The Diplomat (27 July 2015), online: 
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/south-china-sea-philippines-v-china/>.  
	 13 
constituted an integral part of maritime delimitation which is excluded from the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal by virtue of China’s declaration in 2006.60 
In spite of China’s non-appearance, in accordance with Article 9 of Annex VII UNCLOS, the 
arbitration still moved forward. As the arbitral tribunal treated China’s communications as a plea 
concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction, it bifurcated the proceedings into two stages to consider 
issues of jurisdiction and merits separately.61 This bifurcation provided some indication as to the 
importance of jurisdictional issues for the case, and from a broader perspective, the difficulties of 
utilizing third-party settlement for the South China Sea disputes. 
The tribunal rendered its Arbitral Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in October 2015, 
in which it decided to uphold jurisdiction for seven submissions, deferred seven submissions for 
consideration in conjunction with the merits and requested the Philippines to clarify one 
submission. In so doing, the arbitral tribunal essentially rejected two out the three jurisdictional 
objections raised by China. In particular, concerning the nature of the dispute, the arbitral 
tribunal rejected China’s characterization of the Philippines’ submissions as concerning 
sovereignty or maritime delimitation. The tribunal held that Philippines had not requested it to 
rule on sovereignty, nor would the decision on any of the Philippines’ submissions require an 
implicit determination of sovereignty.62 The tribunal also held that the Philippines’ submissions 
concerning the insular features’ entitlement to maritime zones did not constitute a request for 
maritime delimitation. The fixing of the extent of the parties’ entitlement and the delimitation of 
maritime boundary are two distinct issues.63 
The tribunal also found that there was no obstacle to its jurisdiction under Section 1 of Part 
XV which lays out the preconditions to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The tribunal found that the 
instruments documenting the Philippines and China’s commitment to dispute settlement, namely 
bilateral statements, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (“DOC”), 
the Treaty of Amity and the Convention on Biodiversity could not bar the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
under Article 281,64 or Article 282.65 Finally, with regards to the obligation to exchange views 
under Article 283, the tribunal found that there was abundant evidence showing that the parties 																																																								
60 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People's 
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62 Ibid., at 153. 
63 Ibid., at 156. 
64 Ibid., at 229, 248, 269, 289 
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had engaged in serious exchange of views.66 Recalling that Article 283 only requires the parties 
to exchange views regarding the means by which a dispute between them may be settled, and not 
regarding the subject matter of the dispute, the tribunal was satisfied that the parties had 
discharged of their obligations under Article 283.67  
Lastly, the tribunal turned its attention to the limitations and exclusions to compulsory 
jurisdiction under Articles 297 and 298, including the effect of China’s declaration under Article 
298 to exclude certain disputes from its compulsory jurisdiction. The tribunal found that the 
question of whether these articles applied to exclude its jurisdiction was significantly interwoven 
with the merits. Therefore, the tribunal deferred a decision on the jurisdiction those submissions 
of the Philippines that may or may not be excluded from the tribunal’s jurisdiction by virtue of 
Articles 297 and 298 to the merits phase.68  
In the Award on Merits rendered in July 2016, the tribunal confirmed jurisdiction for all the 
remaining submissions, except two. 69  The tribunal confirmed that neither the exception of 
historic rights under Article 298(1)(a)(i) nor the exception of law enforcement under Article 
298(1)(b) applied to exclude the tribunal’s jurisdiction.70 The only exception that was applicable 
was that concerning military activities, which excluded the tribunal from exercising its 
jurisdiction over Submission 14(a) to (c).71  
On the merits, the tribunal made findings which essentially upheld the majority of the 
Philippines’ submissions. Most notably, the tribunal found that China’s claim to the nine-dash 
line over the South China Sea on the basis of historic rights, or other sovereign rights of 
jurisdiction “are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect”.72 Equally important, the 
tribunal agreed with the Philippines that none of the features mentioned in the Philippines’ 
submissions qualified as islands within the meaning of Article 121(1) UNCLOS, but were 
instead only rocks within meaning of Article 121(3) or low tide elevations.73 The tribunal even 
went further to hold that none of the features in the Spratlys could be considered islands, and the 
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high-tide features could only qualify as “rocks”.74 This practically means that no littoral State 
surrounding the South China Sea will be entitled to claim a maritime zone exceeding 12nm from 
these features. The tribunal also found that China breached a series of other obligations under 
UNCLOS, including the obligation to preserve and protect the marine environment through 
harmful fishing practices and harmful construction activities,75  the obligation to respect the 
Philippines’ sovereign rights over living resources of its EEZ with its activities in the South 
China Sea,76 and the obligation to exercise duties of the flag State over its law enforcement 
vessels.77  
The two awards of the Philippines v China arbitration will have a significant impact on the 
South China Sea disputes, widely considered one of the most complicated maritime disputes in 
the world. The fact that the non-appearance of China did not impede the arbitral proceedings 
reaffirmed the compulsory nature of the dispute settlement. The Award on Jurisdiction helped 
strike down many of the arguments commonly used by China to avoid settling the disputes 
through third-party procedures. For example, China places great emphasis on bilateral 
negotiations and insists that this the sole avenue to resolving disputes with its neighbours.78 The 
arbitral tribunal, while acknowledging the importance of negotiations, clarified that States are 
free to utilize other methods of dispute settlement so long as they are in accordance with 
international law.79  
Furthermore, the fact that some of the most controversial issues in the South China Sea were 
examined in the merits phase contributes to untangling existing legal ambiguities in the South 
China Sea.80 For example, although all claimant States acknowledge the need to delimit their 
overlapping maritime zones, the maritime area subject to delimitation has yet to be identified. 																																																								
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This, in turn, is caused by the lack of agreement among the claimant States as to which areas 
could be considered “disputed waters” or which are “non-disputed waters”.81 There are two main 
reasons behind the existence of such obscurity, namely (i) the existence of expansive claims 
which are not recognized by any other claimants, such as China’s nine-dash line and (ii) the 
claimants’ differences in the maritime entitlement of the insular features. It is noteworthy that the 
arbitral tribunal in its Award on Jurisdiction stated that “the Tribunal is obliged not to permit an 
overly technical evaluation of the Parties’ communications or deliberate ambiguity in a Party’s 
expression of its position to frustrate the resolution of a genuine dispute through arbitration.”82 
Indeed, in the merits phase, the tribunal addressed both of the issues of nine-dash line and of 
maritime entitlement in full. The combined result of the tribunal’s finding that maritime claims 
based on the nine-dash line were contrary to UNCLOS and that none of the features in the 
Spratlys were entitled to a 200nm maritime zone helped identify the maximum reach of the 
maritime zones that States could legitimately claim under UNCLOS. As a result, the Award on 
the Merits significantly reduces areas subject to dispute and provides a basis for States to start 
substantially addressing the remaining issues before them.  
The Award on Merits also has the potential to defuse the tension over territorial sovereignty 
disputes, even though these fall outside the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
Sovereignty claims over the tiny insular features are usually aimed not at gaining control over 
the landmass of the features but at the vast maritime zones that are generated from these features 
up to or, in some cases, beyond 200nm. Such control over the waters translates to possession of 
exclusive rights to explore and exploit fisheries resources and oil and gas reserves.83 This is, 
however, only possible if these insular features meet the criteria to be considered as islands under 
Article 121(1) UNCLOS. The holding of the tribunal that all of the features in the Spratlys are 
merely either rocks under Article 121(3) or low-tide elevations under Article 13 means that they 
are not entitled to any waters beyond 12nm. Moreover, for those that qualify as low-tide 
elevations, they cannot be appropriated unless it is located in the territorial sea of a coastal 
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State.84 Such a ruling may put an end to the legitimacy of some sovereignty claims, or at least the 
reduce desire to exert and enforce sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. 
II. SOME REMARKS ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF UNCLOS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
BODIES TO RESOLVING MARITIME DISPUTES IN ASIA 
An examination of the maritime disputes between Asian States which have been brought before 
ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals shows that UNCLOS tribunals have made important and 
meaningful contributions to both the resolution of these specific disputes and beyond. 
ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals managed to provide legal solutions to help the 
disputing parties resolve their differences. In the Land Reclamation case, although the final 
resolution was the product of mutual agreement of the two parties, this agreement could not have 
been possible without the findings of the Group of Expert, whose establishment was required as 
a provisional measure by ITLOS. The boundaries in the Bay of Bengal established by the ITLOS 
and Annex VII arbitral tribunal ended the boundary dispute which had loomed over the bilateral 
relationships of the States concerned for decades. The Award on Jurisdiction in the Philippines v. 
China resolved questions relating to the means of dispute settlement applicable to the case; while 
the Award on the Merits provided answers to some key points of contention between the two 
countries in the South China Sea.  
The settlement of these disputes had broader bearings. First, in all of these cases, the 
decisions of UNCLOS tribunals served as the legal foundation for the parties to reject unlawful 
claims and proceed with their legitimate activities. In the Bay of Bengal cases, the decisions of 
ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals established maritime boundaries after years of 
unsuccessful negotiations, which allowed the States concerned to embark on⎯or continue 
with⎯various economic activities crucial to their economic development. The Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal in the Bangladesh/India indeed took cognizance of this important function of the 
decision, stating that “the maritime boundaries between them, must be determined with precision 
to allow for development and investment.”85 In South China Sea, the Award on Merits, for the 
first time in international jurisprudence, provided clarification to the meaning of historic rights 
claims and clarified the regime of islands under Article 121. The Award thus lent an authoritative 
tool for not only the Philippines but also other States in the region to apply UNCLOS correctly to 
determine the legitimacy of their own and others’ claims and activities. 
Second, UNCLOS tribunals laid the foundation for further negotiations and facilitated 
cooperation and mutual agreements between the parties.  The decisions of UNCLOS tribunals, 																																																								
84 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [2012] I.C.J Rep 624 at 26; Philippines v China, supra 
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despite coming from a third-party, still placed great emphasis on cooperation for the parties to 
see through to the end of the dispute. ITLOS Order in the Land Reclamation case, for example, 
struck a balance between reinforcing the binding nature of the duty to cooperate and leaving a 
margin of appreciation to the parties as to the means to discharge their obligation. As such, this 
decision helped prevent the duty to cooperate from becoming merely rhetoric. The Bay of Bengal 
cases created a “grey area” in which the parties concerned were required to exercise their 
respective sovereign rights in accordance with UNCLOS. They were, nevertheless, free to 
determine the manner in which such sovereign rights were to be allocated and exercised. 
Morever, even before a decision was handed down, the mere fact that legal proceedings were 
underway provided a catalyst for the parties to cooperate more meaningfully. After the initiation 
of the Bangladesh/Myanmar case to ITLOS, for example, the two parties continued to conduct 
bilateral negotiations to reach an agreement.86 The South China Sea arbitral awards admittedly 
did not resolve territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes due to the limits of the 
tribunals’ jurisdiction. However, contrary to what China has insisted, this did not render the 
arbitration “null and void”.87 As analyzed, the arbitral awards clarified existing ambiguities, 
rejected excessive claims, thereby reducing the maritime areas subject to dispute. In other words, 
the arbitration identified the precise scope of what has always been referred to collectively and 
vaguely as the “South China Sea disputes”. Minor as this may seem, the awards laid a highly 
important stepping stone for the parties concerned to engage in more substantial negotiations to 
address the remaining issues that divide them.88  
Third, and perhaps in consequence of the two above-mentioned contributions, the decisions 
of UNCLOS tribunals helped avert serious escalation of conflict, possibly military conflict, 
between the parties. For instance, due to maritime boundary disputes, the Bay of Bengal had to 
witness several instances of military standoff and clashes both on land and at sea. The 
establishment of boundary disputes put an end to possibilities of future clashes and ensured a 
peaceful atmosphere for the region. In the South China Sea case, it may be too early at this point 
to conclude that the arbitral awards have managed to completely prevent future conflicts in the 
region. China’s initial response to the arbitral awards, i.e rejecting the awards and denouncing 																																																								
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the arbitral tribunal, has prompted doubts regarding the extent to which the arbitration could 
have an impact on China’s behaviour and the usefulness of the Philippines’ resort to the 
UNCLOS dispute settlement system. China’s non-compliance rhetoric, however, may not be 
determinative of its long-term reaction. As will be analyzed below, although international law 
does not contain an enforcement mechanism comparable to those of domestic legal systems, in 
the majority of cases, States do eventually comply with the decisions of international courts and 
tribunals.  
Finally, the UNCLOS case law highlights the importance of adjudication and arbitration in 
resolving highly politically, sensitive disputes. It serves a sound reminder that under international 
law, all States are equal sovereigns and are regulated by the rule of law.89 Even though recent 
decades has witnessed an increasing number of Asian States willing to settle disputes between 
them through international legal binding adjudication, these are mostly for economic-related 
disputes.90 Moreover, most of them are between States which are at relatively the same level of 
development and there was mutual agreement between the parties to seek a third-party decision. 
In such context, the fact that the Philippines brought China to arbitration⎯amidst the latter’s 
rejection⎯seems to have departed from the trend.  This was a highly laudable move, which may 
inspire similar response from neighbouring countries. More recently, other States in the region 
such as Vietnam and Indonesia have indicated that they do not rule out the possibility of taking 
China to an international court and tribunal.91 In this sense, the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
system provides a unique avenue for small States to compel adherence to the rule of law. 
III. WHAT ROLE CAN THE UNCLOS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM PLAY IN 
RESOLVING MARITIME DISPUTES IN ASIA? 																																																								
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A. The Advantages of the UNCLOS Dispute Settlement System 
Having examined the contributions made by ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals, the 
question that arises is whether these contributions could only have been made exclusively by 
UNCLOS bodies. In other words, if the parties had reached an agreement to bring the cases to 
any different dispute settlement body, could such body not have been able to resolve the dispute 
in the same manner? The ICJ, for instance, has a wealth of experience in handling maritime 
disputes. If two given parties agree to bring a particular dispute to the ICJ, surely the Court 
would be well able to provide a legal solution to their disputes. However, one important 
condition precedes this scenario, that is both parties have to be able to consent to the jurisdiction 
of a dispute settlement body to hear the case. In actual fact, States are not always able to reach 
such an agreement. For different reasons, a State may wish to continue with existing means of 
settlement, instead of resorting to third-party settlement. This is, of course, perfectly fine as 
sovereign States are free to choose whichever means of dispute settlement available to them, as 
long as it is peaceful in accordance with Article 30 UN Charter and Article 279 UNCLOS. 
However, in the case that negotiations prolong without any discernible or tangible result, the 
refusal of one party to give consent to the jurisdiction of a court and tribunal may bring the 
disputes to a deadlock. This is exactly the situation where the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
system comes in handy and where it distinguishes itself from other international dispute 
settlement fora.  
As mentioned, the dispute settlement procedures listed under Article 287 UNCLOS are 
“compulsory”. This means that by becoming a party to the Convention, States also give their 
consent to the jurisdiction of the dispute settlement bodies set out under Article 287. Put another 
way, a State’s consent to UNCLOS tribunals’ jurisdiction is given by virtue of being a party to 
the Convention. Thus, should a dispute arise concerning the interpretation and application of 
UNCLOS between two State parties of the Convention, any State can unilaterally invoke the 
dispute settlement procedures without having to take any extra step. Although, as will be 
analyzed below, the compulsory jurisdiction of the law of the sea tribunals is subject to several 
limitations, these limitations do not negate the fact that UNCLOS reverses the default position 
under international dispute settlement. This means that compulsory arbitration and adjudication 
now become the norm, not the exception.92 Given the cardinal principle of international dispute 
settlement that international courts can only hear a case if the parties have consented to giving 
them jurisdiction, the default consent given to the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals is a clear 
advantage over other dispute settlement fora in terms of the availability that it offers to States 																																																								
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wishing to use third-party settlement. 93  This advantage is clear when the jurisdiction of 
UNCLOS tribunals is compared, for instance, with the ICJ. Even though the ICJ is the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations, the mere fact that a State is a party to the UN Charter or the 
Statute of the ICJ is not sufficient for the ICJ to have jurisdiction over a dispute arising between 
States parties of the UN. Under Article 36 of the ICJ Statute, in order to recognize the 
jurisdiction of the Court, States have to conclude a special agreement, become party to a treaty 
that provides for the settlement of disputes by the Court or file a unilateral declaration 
recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, compared with the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
system, the extra step required creates additional obstacles for States wishing to make use of 
third-party settlement. 
The UNCLOS dispute settlement system, therefore, can play a useful role in disputes in 
which one side deliberately avoids any means of third-party dispute settlement. It has to be 
emphasized that negotiations are, and should rightly be, the first and primary means of dispute 
settlement for any States. However, in some cases, negotiations can become a shield to guise 
attempts to avoid peaceful settlement in favour of the use of political, military or economic 
pressure in order to achieve certain desired outcome. In such cases, the use of third-party 
settlement proves to be essential to ensure fairness and justice for all those involved. The 
compulsory jurisdiction of UNCLOS underlies and realizes this goal. The default consent given 
to UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies ensures that should negotiations fail, another avenue is 
readily available for peaceful settlement. This was the case, for example, in South China Sea 
disputes, in which China consistently rejected any efforts to resolve the disputes other than 
bilateral negotiations. Thanks to the UNCLOS compulsory jurisdiction, the Philippines was able 
to bring the case to Annex VII arbitral tribunal despite China’s rejection of the arbitration.  
Another example of the usefulness of UNCLOS dispute settlement in a case involving two 
States which are unequal in every aspect, albeit not Asian, can be seen in the Chagos Marine 
Protected Area case.94 Prior to bringing the case to Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, it was reported 
that Mauritius had contemplated on taking the Chagos issues against the UK before the ICJ.95 In 
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what was allegedly an attempt to preempt Mauritius’ intention,96the UK amended its declaration 
accepting the ICJ’s jurisdiction, excluding any dispute involving a current or former member of 
the Commonwealth.97 As a result, Mauritius could not bring the Chagos dispute to the forum it 
had initially planned. The fact that Mauritius was eventually able to bring the case to a tribunal 
under UNCLOS attests to the importance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the UNCLOS dispute 
settlement system for a State wishing to find a way out of their disputes through third-party 
settlement.  Closer to home, Japan recently amended its optional clause declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ which excludes, inter alias, “any dispute arising out of, concerning, or 
relating to research on, or conservation, management or exploitation of, living resources of the 
sea”.98 This means that if a dispute were to arise between Japan and another State which is also a 
party to UNCLOS concerning the conservation, management or exploitation of living resources 
of the sea, the only avenue for third-party settlement left would be that under UNCLOS. In Asia 
where the majority of States have not accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ and the reluctance to 
use international dispute mechanisms is still quite common, at least for non-economic related 
disputes, the fact that many are parties to UNCLOS opens the door for the possibility of using 
third-party settlement. This underlies the unique role the UNCLOS dispute settlement can play in 
the resolution of maritime disputes. 
Furthermore, UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies have shown through their case law that 
they are not hesitant to deliver a decision on issues considered sensitive or thorny. Although the 
jurisprudence generated by UNCLOS bodies has generally followed the approaches taken 
created by other international courts, it is also apparent that UNCLOS bodies have been willing 
to adopt different approaches when called for. As can be seen in the Bay of Bengal maritime 
delimitation cases, both UNCLOS tribunals for the first time embarked on delimiting the 
overlapping outer continental shelves even when none of the parties had received 
recommendations from the CLCS. This approach can be contrasted with that of the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua v. Honduras or Nicaragua v Colombia cases, in which the Court declined to consider 																																																								
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Nicaragua’s submission to delimit the outer continental shelf when the CLCS had not yet made a 
recommendation.99 Admittedly, UNCLOS bodies’ tasks were relatively easier as, unlike the ICJ 
cases, the parties concerned did not dispute the scientific evidence proving the existence of 
entitlements to an outer continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal. They were only divided on the 
legal interpretation of Article 76 UNCLOS. The decisions, however, suggest that ITLOS and 
Annex VII arbitral tribunals are not reluctant to be the pioneer in giving unprecedented answers 
to questions of law. This attitude can also be seen in the Philippines v China awards, where the 
tribunal answered long-debated questions, including whether a dispute over maritime 
delimitation and that over maritime entitlement are distinct or what constitutes a rock under 
Article 121(3) UNCLOS. The Convention, as a result of vast compromises made during the 
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, contains many vague and general provisions. This has 
enabled States to adopt different interpretations and exploitation of the loopholes in the 
application of the Convention in practice.100 The willingness of UNCLOS tribunals not to side-
step thorny and sensitive issues, as did the ICJ in several cases,101  will likely be of more 
assistance to the parties in breaking deadlocks and paving the way for peaceful dispute 
settlement.   
B. The Limitations of the UNCLOS Dispute Settlement System 
Even though the jurisdiction of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies is compulsory, the design of 
the UNCLOS dispute settlement itself may pose hurdles to its utilization and ability to contribute 
to resolving maritime disputes in Asia. First, the setup of the Part XV of UNCLOS creates a 
legal barrier for States to resolve certain disputes even if there is political will to resort to the 																																																								
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system. Second, the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism raises concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of the system in securing compliance with the decisions. 
In respect of the design of the system, compulsory third-party procedures are provided only 
in Section 2 of Part XV, following Section 1 concerning external means of dispute settlement, 
and subjected to the limitations and exclusions included in Section 3. Section 1 requires that 
compulsory procedures under UNCLOS should be used only after States have exhausted the 
means of their choice, including those in other conventions. Furthermore, under Section 3, 
Article 297 paragraphs (2) and (3) automatically exclude certain disputes from the jurisdiction of 
UNCLOS tribunals under all circumstances, Article 298 excludes disputes relating to maritime 
boundary, historic rights, law enforcement activities at sea upon an optional declaration by the 
State. 
The priority accorded to other procedures of settlement over the UNLOS system in Section 1, 
and the exclusions contained in Section 3 have raised doubts concerning the purported 
compulsory nature of the dispute settlement system.102 One commentator contended that the 
exceptions and limitations in Section 3, along with the procedural barriers contained in Section 1, 
create jurisdictional limitations, which in turn create legal uncertainty for the States in deciding 
whether to use the compulsory dispute settlement procedures. This author further argued that 
“legal certainty is one of the critical factors in litigation strategy; if there is a fear that litigation 
may not be successful due to the jurisdictional limitations of the forum, a state is likely to be 
unwilling to use that forum.”103 Moreover, under Article 288(1) UNCLOS dispute settlement 
bodies only have the jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning “the interpretation and application 
of UNCLOS”. It follows that disputes that concern territorial sovereignty per se are beyond the 
reach of UNCLOS tribunals.104  
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The categories of maritime disputes that are excluded from the jurisdiction of UNCLOS 
dispute settlement bodies by virtue of Articles 297 and 298 are precisely those that are most 
prevalent in Asia. For example, maritime boundaries disputes between many States in Asia have 
not been resolved; China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines frequently quarrel over fisheries, 
law enforcement activities over fishermen,105 while China and Japan over military activities 
taking place at sea.106 At the same time, sovereignty disputes, which are deeply intertwined with 
maritime issues, occupy a central role in the mind of the State and its people. The UNCLOS 
dispute settlement system may be of limited use for States in resolving these disputes.  
Nevertheless, the Philippines v China case adeptly demonstrates that these exceptions and 
exclusions in themselves do not render the whole system inoperative. The scope of these 
exceptions is narrower than the interpretation of may States of Articles 297 and 298. As such, 
they do not and cannot serve as a blanket to cover all disputes from the compulsory jurisdiction 
of UNCLOS tribunals. The arbitral tribunal in the Philippines v China case examined each of the 
Articles 297 and 298 in detail to determine the extent to which they prevent the tribunal from 
exercising jurisdiction. The Philippines also succeeded in bringing a case against China despite 
the existence of sovereignty disputes between the two. It follows that the existence of 
sovereignty disputes and the fact that they fall outside the jurisdiction of UNCLOS bodies does 
not necessarily render it impossible for States to resort to Part XV. What it does suggest is that 
States should be mindful that there are limits as to how far UNCLOS tribunals can address the 
their concerns.  
Turning to enforcement and compliance, unlike the ICJ which benefits from an enforcement 
mechanism through the Security Council as the judicial body of the UN, the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the UNCLOS does not have a permanent body which can exercise such 																																																								
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enforcement function. Nevertheless, since the UNCLOS dispute settlement system came into 
operation 20 years ago, the majority of the decisions rendered have been complied with. Apart 
from the recent Philippines v China case, the only other instance in which the respondent State 
rejected the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction and failed to appear before the tribunal was the 
Arctic Sunrise case. In this case, Russia rejected the case brought by the Netherlands against 
it⎯before both ITLOS for provisional measures and Annex VII arbitral tribunal for the 
merits⎯for arresting and detaining the vessels, which were flying the Dutch flag, and its crew. 
Russia announced that it would not promptly comply with the Order of ITLOS requesting it to 
immediately release the Arctic Sunrise and allow the non-Russian crew members to leave the 
Russian territory.107 However, it is worth noticing that in the end, Russia eventually implemented 
all the measures asked by ITLOS.108 Even though the release of the vessels and crew was 
purportedly to comply with Russia’ domestic legislations, the ultimate effect was practically the 
same. This goes to show that the non-compliance rhetoric given by the State does not always 
reflect its behaviour and action on the ground and that the lack of enforcement mechanism in 
international law does not necessarily mean non-compliance. 
C. What Prospects for UNCLOS Dispute Settlement System? 
In recent years, many Asian States have actively been seeking ways to resolve their maritime 
disputes peacefully. States in Southeast Asia, for example, have been negotiating their maritime 
boundaries for decades and clear progress has been made.109 At the same time, several other 
disputes remain unresolved and have caused rising tension. Apart from the South China Sea, the 
East China Sea continues to be a scene of constant conflicts between China, Japan and South 
Korea, and its nature is no less complex that in the South China Sea.110 
Against such a background, it is worth asking what role the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
system could likely play in the resolution of these disputes? In order to answer this question, 																																																								
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factors which motivate the parties to the dispute to resort to third-party settlement and factors 
which discourage States to do so would have to be identified and weighed against one another.  
With regard to the motivating factors, as analyzed above, the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies is an attractive element when States contemplate which 
tribunal to bring their dispute to. The default consent given to the jurisdiction of UNCLOS 
tribunals by virtue of becoming a party to the Convention clearly offers the system an advantage 
over others which require additional steps to be taken in order to establish the consent of States. 
With regards to performance, the fact that UNCLOS tribunals are capable of rendering decisions 
which have been, by and large, positively received by the parties attests to the role that they can 
play in solving what may deem to be the thorniest and most politically sensitive issues. 
Moreover, ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral have been utilized for proceedings of different nature, 
ranging from rendering provisional measures, settling disputes concerning one single issue, such 
as maritime delimitation, to disputes comprising several complicated, intertwined issues. In 
short, the clear blessing of the UNCLOS dispute settlement system rests in the assurance that it 
provides to States that their disputes will not have to go on indefinitely. That consent to 
jurisdiction has already been given ensures that jurisdiction will, with limited exceptions, be 
established and that a legal solution will be provided within a specified time frame. 
Having said that, the decision to initiate a case before an international court of tribunal is 
influenced a string of different factors, including the perceived benefits to be gained from 
judicial settlement, economic incentives, domestic concerns and other strategic consideration, all 
of which determine the level of political will to resort to third-party settlement. The specific 
interests that are at stake can obviously only be judged on a case-by-case basis. It is generally 
agreed, however, that resort to international courts and tribunals by Asian States remains lower 
that other parts of the world.111 An examination of the reasons behind this reality requires an 
analysis that transcends law, and is, therefore, beyond the limited scope of this paper. However, 
if there is any wisdom in the saying “If you want to know the future, look the past”, one indicator 
of Asian States’ willingness to use the UNCLOS dispute settlement is the views that they 
expressed during the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea.  
Not all Asian States were present at the Third Conference, nor did they all express a view on 
the compulsory dispute settlement system that was to be established. A brief perusal of the 
Conference’s negotiating texts and other relevant documents shows that among those that did, 
their stances could be divided into two contrasting groups. The first consisted of States that 																																																								
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vehemently opposed to a compulsory system, including China, India or Indonesia. China 
believed that the establishment of dispute settlement procedures was a way for super-powers to 
protect their vested interests and weaken the provisions in the new law of the sea which reflected 
the interests of third world countries.112 Indonesia showed somewhat a lower level of skepticism, 
saying that it did not rule out the use of compulsory settlement, although it in any case preferred 
consultation and regional machinery.113 Other States, on the other hand, supported the creation of 
compulsory dispute settlement, including Bangladesh,114 South Korea,115 Sri Lanka,116 Singapore 
and the Philippines. Both Bangladesh and Singapore stressed the importance of compulsory 
settlement to smaller countries as a powerful means to help them “prevent interference by large 
countries” and “necessary in order to avoid political and economic pressures”. 117  Past 
performance is, of course, not necessarily indicative of future results, and the opinions of Asian 
States during the Third Conference in the 1970s are certainly not determinative of their attitude 
or approach to the utilization of the UNCLOS dispute settlement today. However, one cannot but 
see a certain level of alignment between the opinions of some States expressed during the Third 
Conference and their legal actions, or lack thereof, under the auspices of UNCLOS in recent 
years.   
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Asia has not traditionally been an active scene of international litigation for sovereignty and 
maritime issues. Negotiations remain the favoured means of dispute settlement and there is no 
obligation for States to bring their disputes to an international court or tribunal.  
However, in light of the positive impacts that the case law of UNCLOS tribunals have 
brought to each State party as well as for the region, it is argued that UNCLOS dispute 
settlement system can play a meaningful role in the process of dispute resolution. The outcome 
of the cases with which ITLOS and Annex VII have dealt involving Asian States shows that 
adjudication and arbitration do not have to be utilized at the expense or exclusion of other means 
of settlement, not least with negotiations. The UNCLOS dispute settlement system, with its 
compulsory jurisdiction, offers States a readily available alternative to situation where 																																																								
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negotiations become symbolic than real, which only leads to stagnation or regressions. UNCLOS 
tribunals have made significant contributions to resolving thorny disputes between Asian States, 
clarifying the legal framework for the conduct of the parties and facilitating cooperation amongst 
countries in the region. The ability of UNCLOS tribunals to bring a peaceful solution to the 
disputes and more broadly to the region also shows that maritime boundary disputes are not 
necessarily destined for indefinite purgatory that has all too often been the norm in Asia.118 
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